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President Nixon Offers New Initiative For Peace, Proposes 'Cease-Fire-In-Place' To End Killing

"There is no goal to which this Nation is more dedicated, and to which I am more dedicated than to build a new structure of peace in the world where every Nation, including North Vietnam as well as the South Vietnamese, can be free and independent with no fear of foreign aggression or foreign domination."

—President Nixon, October 7, 1970

President Nixon has offered a new initiative for peace in Southeast Asia and proposed that all armed forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold. Following are remarks of the President given over radio and television from the White House October 7:

Tonight I would like to talk to you about a major new initiative for peace.

When I authorized operations against the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last April, I also directed that an intensive effort be launched to develop new approaches for peace in Indochina.

In Ireland on Sunday, I met with the chiefs of our delegation to the Paris talks. This meeting marked the culmination of a Government-wide effort begun last spring on the negotiation front. After considering the recommendations of all my principal advisors, I am tonight announcing new proposals for peace in Indochina.

This new peace initiative has been discussed with the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. All support it. It has been made possible in large part by the remarkable success of the Vietnamization program over the past 18 months. Tonight I want to tell you what these proposals are and what they mean.

First, I propose that all armed forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold. This would be a "cease-fire-in-place." It would not in itself be an end to the conflict, but it would accomplish one goal all of us have been working toward: *an end to the killing.*

I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining a cease-fire in a guerrilla war where there are no front lines. But an uncon-

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Reviews 'Amnesty Programs'

Drug Abuse In Armed Forces Outlined To Special Subcommittee

"Amnesty programs," designed to encourage and enable members of the Armed Forces to seek out professional help in overcoming drug abuse problems, are reportedly "having a salutary and beneficial effect" in the Republic of Vietnam.

Noting, however, that the Department of Defense views the matter of drug abuse with serious concern, Defense officials appeared before a Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to Investigate Alleged Drug Abuse by Members of the Armed Forces Sept. 30.

Representing DoD were Vice Admiral William P. Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Mr. Frank A. Bartimo, an Assistant General Counsel.

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President Nixon Offers New Initiative For Peace

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ventional war may require an unconventional true; our side is ready to stand still and cease firing.

I ask that this proposal for a cease-fire-in-place be the subject for immediate negotiation. And my hope is that it will break the logjam in all the negotiations.

This cease-fire proposal is put forth without preconditions. The general principles that should apply are these:

—A cease-fire must be effectively supervised by international observers, as well as by the parties themselves. Without effective supervision a cease-fire runs the constant risk of breaking down. All concerned must be confident that the cease-fire will be maintained and that any local breaches of it will be quickly and fairly repaired.

—The cease-fire should not be the means by which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina.

—And a cease-fire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror.

—A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we do seek is to widen the peace.

—Finally, a cease-fire should be a part of a general move to end the war in Indochina.

A cease-fire-in-place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it has always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace,

'The essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between States in the Indochina area. We shall accept the results of agreements reached between those States.'

we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations.

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters.

A second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

I propose an Indochina Peace Conference. At the Paris talks today, we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders and establishing bases in South Vietnam—they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well.

An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three States of Indochina. The war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak.

The essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between States in the Indochina area. We shall accept the results of agreements reached between those States.

While we pursue the convening of an Indochina Peace Conference, we will continue negotiations in Paris. Our proposal

'We are ready now to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an over-all settlement.'

for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as through other diplomatic channels.

The Paris talks will remain our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement, until such time as a broader international conference produces serious negotiations.

The third part of our peace initiative has to do with United States forces in South Vietnam.

In the past 20 months, I have reduced our troop ceilings in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year, these withdrawals will have totalled more than 260,000 men—about one-half of the number that were in South Vietnam when I took office.

As the American combat role and presence have decreased,

VIETNAMIZATION—U.S. Civic Action and South Vietnamization automotive instructors check list of items of condemned and salvaged materials supplied to automotive training base in Republic of Vietnam.

American casualties have also decreased. Our casualties since the completion of the Cambodian operation were the lowest for a comparable period in the last four and a half years.

We are ready now to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an over-all settlement.

We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight.

Fourth, I ask the other side to join us in a search for a political settlement, that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese.

Three principles govern our approach:

—We seek a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people.

—A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces in South Vietnam.

—And we will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Let there be no mistake about one essential point: *the other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities in the South Vietnamese Government. They want to dismantle the organized non-Communist parties and insure the takeover by their party. They demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government.*

This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable.

As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters. But we stand firm for the right of all the South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want.

'I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much.'

We have no intention of seeking any settlement at the conference table other than one which fairly meets the considerable concerns of both sides. We know that when the conflict ends, the other side will still be there. And the only kind of settlement that will endure is one that both sides have an interest in preserving.

Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.

War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much.

I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception and without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice.

And I propose that all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well.

The immediate release of all prisoners of war would be a simple act of humanity.

But it could be even more. It could serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus improve the prospects for negotiation.

We are prepared to discuss specific procedure to complete the speedy release of all prisoners.

The different proposals that I have made tonight can open the door to an enduring peace in Indochina.

Ambassador Bruce will present these proposals formally to the other side in Paris tomorrow. He will be joined in that presentation by Ambassador Lam representing South Vietnam.

Let us consider for a moment what the acceptance of these proposals would mean.

Since the end of World War II, there has always been a war

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going on somewhere in the world. The guns have never stopped firing. By achieving a cease-fire in Indochina, and by holding firmly to the cease-fire in the Middle East, we could hear the welcome sound of peace throughout the world for the first time in a generation.

We could have some reason to hope that we had reached the beginning of the end of war in this century. We might then be on the threshold of a generation of peace.

The proposals I have made tonight are designed to end the fighting throughout Indochina and to end the impasse in negotiations in Paris. Nobody has anything to gain by delay and only lives to lose.

There are many nations involved in the fighting in Indochina. Tonight, all those nations, except one, announce their readiness to agree to a cease-fire. The time has come for the Government of North Vietnam to join its neighbors in a proposal to quit making war and to start making peace.

'We could have some reason to hope that we had reached the beginning of the end of war in this century. We might then be on the threshold of a generation of peace.'

As you know, I have just returned from a trip which took me to Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, England and Ireland.

Hundreds of thousands of people cheered me as I drove through the cities of those countries.

They were not cheering for me as an individual. They were cheering for the country that I was proud to represent—the United States of America. For millions of people in the free world, the non-aligned world and the Communist world, America is a land of freedom, of opportunity, of progress.

'. . . No world leader to whom I have talked fears that the United States will use its great power to dominate another country or to destroy its independence. We can be proud that this is the cornerstone of America's foreign policy.'

I believe there is another reason they welcomed me so warmly in every country I visited, despite their wide differences in political systems and national backgrounds.

In my talks with leaders all over the world, I find that there are those who may not agree with all of our policies. No world leader to whom I have talked fears that the United States will use its great power to dominate another country or to destroy its independence. We can be proud that this is the cornerstone of America's foreign policy.

There is no goal to which this nation is more dedicated, and to which I am more dedicated than to build a new structure of peace in the world where every nation, including North Vietnam as well as the South Vietnamese, can be free and independent with no fear of foreign aggression or foreign domination.

I believe every American deeply believes in his heart that the proudest legacy the United States can leave during this period when we are the strongest nation of the world is that **our power was used to defend freedom, not to destroy it; to preserve the peace, not to break the peace.**

It is in that spirit that I make this proposal for a just peace in Vietnam and in Indochina.

I ask that the leaders in Hanoi respond to this proposal in the same spirit. Let us give our children what we have not had in this century, a chance to enjoy a generation of peace.

CIVIC ACTION—A U. S. Civic Action program officer "needles" baseball-capped Vietnamese lad, one of 450 villagers inoculated against bubonic plague.

Defense Secretary Laird Assures NATO Countries Of U.S. Support

During his recent trip to Europe with President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird reemphasized the importance the United States attaches to its commitment to the NATO nations, particularly those nations involved in the Mediterranean. In Ankara, Turkey, Oct. 1, Secretary Laird noted the great importance the U.S. places on the Nixon Doctrine—which is based upon partnership, strength, and the willingness to negotiate. Secretary Laird was accompanied by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following are excerpts of a press conference at Ankara, with opening remarks by Secretary Laird.

President Nixon has made it abundantly clear on many occasions of the importance of consultations with our NATO allies. He has come to the Mediterranean area to highlight once again the importance which we attach to our commitment, not only to the NATO nations, but particularly to those nations which are involved in the Mediterranean.

We are embarked upon a policy in the United States which has been referred to as the Nixon Doctrine, which is based upon partnership, strength and the willingness to negotiate. We are moving forward with negotiations in several very important areas, not only as far as the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) talks are concerned, and as far as the Middle East is concerned.

We place great importance on the partnership theme of the Nixon Doctrine, as well as maintaining strong and sufficient military strength in order for our negotiation policy to be successful. We are moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, but strength, military strength, is very important, as we move in this direction.

NOTES IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL FIELDS

As we maintain our military strength we also, through the NATO organization, are moving to other fields, such as the field of ecology and environmental problems. In the 20th anniversary speech of President Nixon at the NATO meeting in Washington, he pointed out the importance of moving into the environmental field, such as health, water pollution, air pollution.

One of our first projects with which we have cooperated with the NATO countries is right here in Turkey and that has to do with the problem of air pollution.

Question: Will the United States maintain the same troop strength if the European countries pay some of the costs? What are the prospects for the U.S. Mid-East peace initiatives in the wake of civil strife in Jordan and Nasser's death?

Answer: President Nixon has made it very clear since his filling the office of President, that we will maintain our commitment and our obligations to NATO Alliance has shown the importance that can be attached to partnership arrangement. For over 20 years, over two decades, there has been peace in Europe, in the NATO area, because of the partnership arrangement and because of the kind of cooperation that we have not only in the military field, but in other areas with our NATO allies. The United States will maintain its commitment, it will maintain a force capability during the next few years as far as I can see.

Now, as far as capability is concerned, there are weapons improvements from time to time and we plan to assign the most modern type of aircraft, the most modern kinds of weapons to our NATO forces. This commitment which we have made we will continue to make. As far as the question of burden-sharing, we do believe that all nations in the Alliance should help share the burden of the military costs. Burden-sharing does not necessarily mean a financial contribution although it could mean a financial contribution.

It also means a military contribution, and burden-sharing can be made up not only of an increased military contribution by nations that are involved in the Alliance here, but also can be made up by increased financial contributions by nations that make up the Alliance.

As far as the financial contribution is concerned, I expect our Congress to approve the request which we have made to cover our NATO force structure in this session without any reduction. As you know, we're in Fiscal Year 1971, and the fiscal year is one-quarter over. But I expect our Congress to make no reductions as far as the financial requests that we have placed before the Congress to cover our NATO commitments in Fiscal Year 1971 contrary to some of the reports you may have had.

It is very hard to make such an assessment at this time. President Nasser was a strong leader in the Arab world, and his loss will have an effect, there is no question about that.

HIGH PRIORITY

I think it's a little early to make a final assessment as to the effect on the peace initiative in that area. The United States as well as all nations of NATO, it seems to me, should have a very high priority placed on bringing some degree of order out of the chaos that does exist in the Middle East at the present time. It will be our goal—and we will do whatever we can—to see that the cease-fire is maintained and to also use any influence which we have on any nations of the world to help us move toward a settlement in that area of the world. The reason President Nixon visited the Mediterranean area at this time is to show our interest, our concern, and our dedication to restoring and maintaining peace and stability in this area of the world.

The talks were very worthwhile. We had a very good exchange of ideas with regard to strengthening—particularly the southeastern flank of the NATO Alliance and the important role that Turkey plays in this Alliance. We discussed the possibility of the future military assistance program in the area of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. And I believe the discussions were mutually beneficial not only to the United States and Turkey but also for the future of the NATO Alliance.

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General Holloway Presents Strategic Facts, Reviews U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military Power

Gen. Holloway

The United States faces a double threat, Air Force General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander In Chief, Strategic Air Command, asserted in a recent speech.

Gen. Holloway said, "Our domestic problems, though real difficult, are soluble. I am confident they will be solved because our society has the humanistic urge to solve them. But if we cannot solve our external problems, then it will not be worth the trouble."

Gen. Holloway made his remarks during the annual meeting of the American Ordnance Association's Missiles and Astronautics Division at SAC Headquarters, Omaha, Neb.

Following are excerpts from his address:

I remember a time a quarter century ago when the whole edge of the world was black with the destruction of war and we were unprepared to defend ourselves. I remember an army drilling with broomsticks and an air corps—in the nation which gave birth to the airplane—without one single first line fighter. I remember a President—Franklin D. Roosevelt—asking that military-industrial complex to build and operate 50,000 airplanes to a chorus of incredulity and scorn. American defense and industry produced and operated those planes and a million other tools of defense so that our society could survive and prosper, so that detractors could be free to criticize. I remember these things well.

We need this help no less—and perhaps more—today. It is not without fault. There are many stringent problems in defense-industry teamwork. The Secretary of Defense and his Deputy have analyzed these problems and provided the impetus for us to reduce them. Their solution has been and will be continuous. The dynamics of the challenge itself have created a terribly swift evolution, so management and efficiency must necessarily be a fast horse on a demanding track. I am proud to be numbered as among the military-industrial cooperative workers.

The last world war dramatized what this combine can do. It put the United States of America at the top of the heap. Our supremacy amongst all nations was unquestioned. But things did not remain that way very long. This country gave up some of its advantages immediately. And as we vacillated in levels of preparedness over the years—dependent upon proliferated interpretation of the public concern—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics closed the strategic gap between us, laboriously at first, later through an exponential-like growth. Now we are in immediate danger of losing the number one billing. I am not much given to lamenting the "glory that was Rome" but stock-taking is perilously in order. We used to phrase a need for that stock-taking as a question: *Where are we?*

We are now—as Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has said—"*at the edge of prudent risk,*" but in more ways than one. The richest, most powerful, most generous nation in the history of the world is economically pressed to make its income approach its expenditures. It is faced with minute but vociferous dissent and unlawful behavior from groups determined to deny the freedom and tolerance which allows them to exist. It is troubled by lawful dissent which seeks to reverse overnight decades of carefully constructed policy, and reorder priorities along idealistic but dangerously naive lines.

In this dissent there are those who would—because of grievances real and imagined—divide the nation along lines of race or religion or sex or job or income.

We live today in a country damned rightly and universally for its excesses, yet praised faintly or not at all for its successes.

Our domestic problems, though real and difficult, are soluble. I am confident that they will be solved because our society has the humanistic urge to solve them. But if we cannot solve our external problems, then it will not be worth the trouble. For the central fact of our time—for all the world—is the present relative equality of U.S. and Soviet strategic military power. Since this power is the foundation of all diplomacy as well as war, and since the Soviet Union demonstrates so clearly a desperation to achieve strategic supremacy, then the United States faces the greatest jeopardy to its existence since that war against fascism a quarter century ago, if not for all time. The particulars are abundant. They were evident in the swift, powerful military action in Czechoslovakia two years ago. They were evident last year in the meteoric growth of Soviet presence and power in the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas. They were evident this year in Soviet worldwide military exercises and in Soviet men and materiel in Egypt.

The facts behind the facts which make the U.S.S.R. so bold are apparent in unequivocal allied intelligence. Some essentials are:

—200 heavy bombers and air refueling tankers;
—700 medium bombers;
—1,300 intercontinental ballistic missiles;
—700 medium range ballistic missiles;
—270 sub-launched ballistic missiles;
—and a strategic defense which is by several orders of magnitude the world's strongest, and which includes thousands of radars, fighters, missiles, and an operational anti-ballistic missile system.

Our dispassionate evaluation of these combined factors tells us that U.S. Strategic Forces are at best about equal at this

time. But while we study, they continue to build. If this buildup of strategic nuclear power continues without some reciprocity on our part, the Soviet Union will attain complete supremacy by mid-decade. These facts and these projections are awesome and sobering to those of us who live with them. No negotiations, no good intentions, no concessions can erase their enormity.

There are many citizens today who wonder aloud: *"What do you suppose they are doing that for?"* What I wonder is how anybody wonders what they are doing it for. Dedicated Communists still devoutly believe in the inevitability of their movement worldwide in some form, regardless of differences. It is clear to me that the Soviet Union wants to make it happen the "easy" way. Its leaders would appear to feel that if they can achieve that supremacy, they could force the world through nuclear blackmail to accept the Kremlin solution to all the crises it encountered or engineered.

Fellow Communist countries could either cheer their leader or be recipients of the Brezhnev Doctrine. And we and our allies would be forced to renege on confrontation after confrontation until it was clear that the game was over. Lenin, the Soviet "saint," has written: *"The soundest strategy is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy."*

America's hope and determination must be that the Soviets never reach such a position. This determination must be marshalled, and the minority irresolution of "better red than dead" stamped out. The reasonable courses of negotiation and strategic sufficiency, which U.S. leaders have wisely embraced, must be better understood, believed in, and patriotically supported.

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks are a momentous effort and a great cause. They give us hope that we may end an otherwise endless arms race because such an end could be mutually beneficial.

There is some cause for optimism that such talks might be a prelude to a great peace provided other things are also curbed. Such hopes are cause for exhilaration, but exhilaration must be flavored with the bitterness of experience, and the cautions of reason. Nothing favorable in the real world of individual and group competition ever comes by magic, or through willful weakening of one's bargaining position.

In spite of this axiom of human nature there are those who appear to believe that their hopes are sufficient cause for unilateral concessions. They tell us that if we make reductions as signs of good faith, the U.S.S.R. will reciprocate. It is inconceivable to me that anyone really believes this. But even if they did, I don't see how we could expect a quid pro quo from someone with the quid and the quo in his hand. The essence of negotiation is trade, not gift. We must negotiate from strength, and we must guard against the Soviets moving to strategic supremacy by deploying weapons while we talk. Strategic arms limitations agreements must be inspectable and enforceable if they are to work, and one must expect considerable delays.

The U.S. defense community has already designated improvements which will negate near-term Soviet advances. Basically, these improvements consist of improved warning systems, modernization of strategic offensive weapons, and some first big steps in strategic defense. I am just optimistic enough to believe that we will be earnest but firm in our negotiations and that we will get the modernization needed for our strategic forces. When the American people are aware of the real nature of the threat, as well as the hope, they will transition to a vocal majority, and *"government by the people"* will indorse programs that are necessary. I am optimistic enough to believe that in this country the desire is equivalent to the deed, for we are a nation of doers. The big problems now are to make sure people are aware of the facts in time to do the things that need to be done.

If my optimism in the American people is justified, then our immediate future will develop along one of two probable routes: *continued strategic sufficiency under arms limitations or a resurgent arms race caused by breakdown of negotiations.* We must hope and work for the former, but prepare for the latter. All other alternatives are unacceptable worlds in which those of us surviving would be slaves to an alien society.

Presidential Proclamation

VETERANS DAY — NOVEMBER 11, 1970

Veterans Day, 1970, is an appropriate time for all Americans to reflect again on the meaning—and the price—of peace and freedom. For this is a time when we pause to honor those Americans who have been willing to risk life itself in the service of these ideals—from Valley Forge to Vietnam.

On an occasion like this, we feel the common bond which unites the American people across the centuries. We are reminded again that millions of Americans through the years have felt so deeply about our national ideals that they have been willing to set aside plans and hopes and friends and family to serve in the Armed Forces of the nation. We are proud to know that the spirit of sacrifice and service continues to characterize our country.

On this Veterans Day our thoughts are especially with those who have returned from the war in Vietnam and those who are still a part of it, with those who are held as prisoners and those who lie in hospitals, with those who are missing in action and those who died in combat. All of these men and women have proved themselves worthy inheritors of the great traditions which veterans of other wars established and maintained. Though much has changed in our country through the decades, the selfless devotion of our fighting men has not changed.

It is important that all of our servicemen and all of our nearly 28 million living veterans understand that there is something else which has not changed in this country: the gratitude and respect which the American people feel for them. These feelings are expressed in many ways—formal and informal, tangible and intangible. They find very concrete expression in the work of the Veterans Administration, which is celebrating its 40th anniversary this year . . . .

It is my hope that on this day all Americans will offer special prayers for peace and for the safety of those who now serve in our Armed Forces. And let us all in silent tribute pay special honor to those who have paid the full price to keep our freedom alive . . . .

RICHARD NIXON

NATO—21 Years Of Success

Realities Of Defending Western Europe

Gen. Goodpaster

At a recent meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, discussed the problems and progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over the past 21 years. Following is the text of General Goodpaster's address.

It is in Germany that a major portion of our Allied Forces face the Iron Curtain.

Some nine years ago I commanded one of those divisions charged with the mission of defending NATO territory in Germany and so in a way I feel at home in this familiar environment.

Now, however, I want to talk to you not as an American officer but primarily as a NATO commander—for it is in that capacity that I am principally involved with the planning for the defense of Western Europe. This is a matter of concern to you as businessmen engaged in commerce in this thriving and prosperous economy, where the NATO shield makes possible the international stability and peace we have today.

It is not difficult to talk to men well-versed in economic principles, who can measure quickly the matters of loss or gain, gross or net, who know the problems of lead time and who have the capability to optimize business opportunities. In a modern military organization, dependent on weapons systems created jointly by the users and industry, there can be no effective armed force without an industrial base to support it. I know that you are realists and today I would like to speak of the realities of defending Western Europe.

The Threat Remains

The investment in NATO for 21 years can be measured in a very real sense against the remarkable economic gains which have been made through trade and investments on both sides of the Atlantic.

There is a vital link between the tranquillity in the NATO area and the strong commercial bonds which have developed in the West. The confidence in the NATO shield has been essential and fundamental in making possible a favorable environment for national economic plans, as well as a climate in which international trade within our Atlantic Community could develop and expand.

The factors that influenced the formation of the Alliance in its earliest days have changed little in the intervening 20 years. It was then and is now the external threat that brought and still binds the nations together as a collectivity. By external threat I refer, of course, to the hard and tangible facts of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military strength. Those military forces, quite literally, overhang NATO Europe by virtue of their capability to engulf it. While diplomatic initiatives to lessen the causes of tension on this continent and between the U.S. and Soviets proceed, this growing naval, ground, air and missile threat, with both conventional and nuclear capabilities, poses an undiminished danger to peace and freedom in the West, initially and directly on the European side of the Atlantic, but thereby and just as surely on the American and Canadian side as well.

Soviet Modernization Programs

The massive capabilities of the large Soviet ground forces have been well-recognized for many years by those of you in Germany. It is still worth specific mention, however, that these forces have been undergoing continuous and extensive modernization, steadily adding to the firepower of their units, and increasing their mobility. They are not only well-equipped; they are well-trained and positioned where they could easily move directly in a surprise attack.

Further, because they serve an expansionist doctrine whereas NATO is solely dedicated to defense, the advantage of the initiative lies always with these Communist forces—an advantage not available to Allied Command Europe. At the time of their invasion in Czechoslovakia, they exercised this initiative with ruthless, but overwhelming and efficient effect. Their capabilities for such sudden action, convincingly displayed at that time, have been further improved during the past two years.

Quantitative Superiority

Likewise, in the air, continued technological progress is being carried on together with intensive training and frequent wide-scale air exercises. The Soviet air forces in Europe are quantitatively considerably superior to the air forces of Allied Command Europe.

The Soviet strategic nuclear threat, both in rocket forces and ABM, has been increasing in magnitude, as has been specifically noted by Secretary Melvin Laird in recent months; and this increasing trend is rightly of serious concern. The momentum they have achieved, if continued, could place the Soviet Union in a position of nuclear superiority by the year 1974-75.

This is a sobering thought indeed, for if the Alliance is to maintain an effective deterrent, there must be an unquestioned strategic retaliatory capability to break up tactical nuclear and conventional forces—in order to discourage a would-be aggressor from the temptation to use armed forces against the free world.

The dimension of Soviet naval power were recently evidenced on the seas and oceans of the world during the widspread *Exercise OKEAN*. This expansion of Soviet maritime power included the addition last year of more surface and nuclear-powered submarine warships to the Soviet fleet, and construction continues.

Second Largest Fleet

Already the world's second largest fleet, their combat vessels include only one per cent that are over 20 years old—a figure that contrasts sharply with the growing obsolescence of NATO units.

These are some of the more evident realities of the Soviet threat that are posed to all parts of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic.

They show the external dangers—the land, air, rocket and naval forces of the Warsaw Pact—that the Alliance must be prepared to face. Taken together they form a concentration of military power that exceeds anything the world has ever previously seen. These Soviet forces far exceed anything that is required solely for defense. And as I have mentioned earlier, they are increasing, not decreasing. Correspondingly, the security problem they present to the West, is increasing, not decreasing.

That power, if it is to be held in check, must be faced with a deterrent posture consisting of an integrated military structure supported by the adequate and effective armed forces provided by our respective nations to the collective defense force of the West.

Effective Deterrence

For deterrence to be effective requires of the North Atlantic Alliance an effective strategy, backed by forces of adequate capability and supported by a collective willingness to make the efforts and sacrifices needed—that is, by a mutual determination to remain free. Strategy, capabilities and determination are, in a large degree, interconnected and interdependent. But each warrants a specific look.

First, the strategy.

NATO has developed an agreed strategy which provides direction to NATO commanders and guides the programing of national force contributions to the NATO commands.

Its primary objective is deterrence: preventing war and making peace secure. It seeks to make clear to any would-be aggressor that the peoples of the Atlantic Community are prepared to defend their territory and people and to make aggression unprofitable.

It does this first by calling for a forward defense—not surrendering large areas and populations, but engaging an aggression from the outset—and second by calling for a flexible choice of options with which to respond to an aggressor's attack.

Words Vs. Facts

But when we speak of strategy, there is an important distinction to be made between what I call the **"strategy in words"** and the **"strategy in fact."** Our strategy *in words*, as just described, is one of flexible response based upon a wide range of options, but even now resource limitations tend to restrict our strategy *in fact* to only a narrow segment of the wide spectrum of options that was envisioned when the strategy was adopted.

In other words, the strategy depends on the military capabilities—the military forces—that are provided to carry it out; and this is another area of concern.

The force posture demanded by the strategy is basically composed of three parts. The first of these is conventional armed forces—Army, Navy, and Air—which, when properly manned, trained and equipped, provide the means of meeting non-nuclear aggression with sufficient force to require that the burden of escalation rests with the enemy.

The Nuclear Role

Linked to the conventional forces must be the other two elements of the required force posture: tactical nuclear weapons that supply the flexibility of firepower needed by the strategic concept, and strategic nuclear forces—the ultimate deterrence, the ultimate defense.

Recently I was asked by a European reporter whether the United States would be willing to utilize nuclear weapons, since the Soviet submarines *now* put the cities of the United States on the "firing line."

The response was simply to recall that all the cities of the Alliance—American included—had already been on the "firing line" for a long time—ever since the Soviet Union achieved a nuclear capability. We should remember that all signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty have agreed that **"an attack on one is an attack on all."**

This provision makes clear the need for concerted allied reaction, not piecemeal or isolated response.

Men, Money, Materiel

Indispensable to the military forces that constitute an effective capability for deterrence and defense is the provision of the men, money and materiel needed to create and maintain them.

It is here that the people of the West must stand up and be counted: **counted in terms of the taxes they are willing to pay, the military service they are willing to undertake, the materiel they are willing to provide.** In a very literal sense, the strength of a nation's desire to remain free and at peace is measured by what it will give up or pay for this purpose.

We find ourselves, of course, in a period when the pressures of social, economic and internal political problems in all the nations of the Alliance pose themselves heavily in competition with the demands of defense and international security.

No one can deny that the social and economic demands of our peoples must receive the most thoughtful of attention.

But it seems equally true that if there is to be enduring progress in dealing with such demands, it can only be achieved in an environment of international security and stability.

A Determined Commitment

Without the strong deterrent to military adventurism that is provided by a viable NATO, the aspiration of the people of

(Continued On Page Twelve)

Law And The Countries Of The U.N.

The results of a six-year effort by 31 member nations of the United Nations were described in a recent speech by U.S. Alternate Representative Richard H. Gimer before the Legal Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. He made his remarks in explaining the United States' support of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States In Accordance with the United Nations Charter. Excerpts of his prepared text follow.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is pleased to have participated in the six-year effort that has produced the Declaration of the Law of the United Nations Charter now before the Legal Committee.

We think it appropriate to say a few words concerning the history and character of this effort, as well as to comment on important aspects of the principles set forth in the Declaration.

Experience Vs. New Members

The early 1960s saw the admission of many newly independent countries to membership in the United Nations. In the year 1960 alone, 15 African States and Cyprus became members of this organization. These States had not participated in the San Francisco Conference and the drawing up of the United Nations Charter.

While they had freely accepted the rights and obligations of the Charter when applying for membership, they naturally had their own views as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the Charter. By 1963, moreover, for both original and more recent members alike, a careful analysis of the Charter in the light of 20 years of experience seemed both a timely and useful contribution to the anticipated 20th anniversary of the United Nations in 1965.

These factors convinced the United States of the desirability of undertaking a careful analysis of the basic legal principles of the Charter governing the conduct of States.

Along with many other Governments, my Government sought during the course of the undertaking to make clear our understanding that the task of the study was to elaborate upon . . . Charter principles, rather than to engage in Charter amendment or Charter revision.

We thus took as our task an "elaboration" of fundamental Charter principles, that is, the process of spelling out in important detail the implications of these Charter principles, taking into account the experience of the members of the United Nations since this most basic of post-war treaties entered into force in 1945.

Clarification of U.N. Charter

Looked at in the broadest scale, the Declaration represents a helpful clarification of the tersely stated principles of the Charter.

The high quality of the Declaration is clearly reflected in the elaboration of the first, and most difficult, of the seven principles, that relating to the prohibition . . . of the threat or use of force in international relations. It seems appropriate to assert that the frequent and tragic uses of illegal force the world has witnessed since 1945 do not detract from the effort to work out agreement as to what the rule of law requires of States.

The Declaration states . . . that:

"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State."

And it goes on to state that:

"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State . . ."

The elaboration of the prohibition against the use of force likewise makes a positive contribution to the body of international law by stating that an illegal use of force is no less illegal because it arises in the context of an international line of demarcation rather than an ancient and recognized state frontier.

Charter Fulfillment

There are similar constructive contributions in the Declaration's elaboration of the duty of States to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter. Here we find unequivocal statements of this fundamental principle:

"Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by it in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

"Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles of international law.

"Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under international agreements valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law."

* * *

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to comment on the details of a number of specific aspects of the Declaration.

First, with regard to the elaboration of the prohibition against the threat or use of force, I wish to state again, as spokesmen for the United States have stressed at earlier stages, that the prohibition against war propaganda relates

to the conduct, activities, and statements of Governments. It does not touch individual conduct, activities, or statements, nor those of individuals acting together in non-governmental groups or organizations.

It should also be noted that the force elaboration does not deal with such questions as the furnishing of military assistance to another State. The paragraphs on civil strife and terrorism, which as I have said, are a major achievement of the Declaration, do not limit or otherwise affect the right of a State to provide assistance to a friendly government, including military assistance involving material, personnel, or technology.

Mutual Cooperation

With respect to the elaboration of the principle of cooperation between States, it should be stressed that one of the recurrent themes of international law is that of reciprocity.

The United States considers that the duty to cooperate is premised on the idea of reciprocity. A failure to cooperate cannot legitimately be asserted by a State that has itself failed or has been unwilling to engage in cooperation with the State whose conduct it would denounce.

Turning now to the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United States is glad that the Declaration recognizes the right of self-determination as belonging to "all peoples." Important as the right is to the peoples of dependent territories, the principle of self-determination is universal in scope. . . .

Second, the United States supports the statement of obligation "to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned" because of the importance we attach to the wishes of dependent peoples themselves.

"We place special importance on the statement that 'All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community'."

It goes without saying that there can be differences in good faith over the best pace of political development for a particular dependent territory. Reasonable men can differ with respect to the meaning of "speedy" changes in the relationships between an administering authority and its dependent territory.

Self-Determination

Third, I wish to stress the importance we attach to the . . . rule contained in the fourth paragraph of the self-determination elaboration which asserts that there are equally legitimate political alternatives lying at the end of the road of self-determination in addition to independent statehood. The text rightly states that "The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State, or the emergency into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by the people."

Fourth, . . . the United States agrees fully with the statement by the British representative in the Friendly Relations Committee . . . when he pointed out that the text cannot "be regarded as affording legal sanction for any and every course of action which might be taken in the circumstances contemplated." We agree . . . that States are not entitled "under the Charter, to intervene by giving military support or armed assistance in non-self-governing territories or elsewhere. The support which . . . States were entitled to give to peoples deprived of their right to self-determination was . . . limited to such support as was in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and was therefore controlled by the overriding duty to maintain international peace and security." In short, the Declaration does not constitute a license for gunrunning . . . .

"The United States considers that the Declaration on Principles of International Law is a worthy contribution to the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations and to our efforts to further the cause of world peace."

Finally, I need hardly underscore the fact that nothing in this . . . paragraph of the self-determination elaboration limits the right or responsibility of an administering authority to employ appropriate measures of police protection in order to maintain law and order in the territories for which it is responsible.

Equality of States

Turning briefly to another principle, we believe that no statement about the law can fail to take into account the principle of the sovereign equality of States which is so clearly and succinctly set forth in . . . the Charter. It is set forth with equal clarity in the Declaration. We place special importance on the statement that "All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community . . . ."

Mr. Chairman, the United States considers that the Declaration on Principles of International Law is a worthy contribution to the 25th anniversary of the United Nations and to our efforts to further the cause of world peace.

It follows with distinction the recent positive contribution made in such other legal fields as the Outer Space Treaty and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Like all important statements of law, it should have a stabilizing effect on relations among States and thus permit the processes of national development and regional and international cooperation to bring a better life to all peoples.

The Declaration is a positive and balanced clarification of the rights and duties of States contained in the Charter. We hope it will prove acceptable to the United Nations as a whole and that all States will live up to its rules of conduct.



Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium

NATO—21 Years Of Success

(Continued From Page Nine)

our nations for the accomplishment of social and economic programs could well prove to be no more than impossible dreams.

For the West to show that it retains the determination to keep itself free and secure requires that it show its commitment resolutely, responsibly and tangibly—in men, military materiel and money.

Earlier I spoke of the fact that Soviet strength—nuclear missiles and conventional armies, navies and air fleets alike—continues to increase. It is on a rising curve.

In contrast I regret to say that NATO's course, in recent years, shows in many areas a downward pattern of movement. We are still strong; and there have been important and sound improvements, especially qualitative improvements through modernization.

But there have also been reductions of forces, shortfalls in manning, withdrawals from forward areas, curtailment of terms of service, growing obsolescence of fleets, delays in providing needed communications and command facilities, as graphic examples. And more are threatened.

The combination of these two trends—the one upward in the Warsaw Pact and one downward in NATO—means that before our very eyes, but with all-too-little recognition of the consequences, a shift in the balance of security is occurring.

The margin of deterrence is being reduced, and the resultant risks to NATO are being increased.

NATO Insurance

Yet the "insurance policy" that we in NATO are buying for security is not so expensive, for any of our countries, when compared to the tremendous costs that would be incurred if war were once more to break out—a war whose outcome could destroy in a few days a Western civilization that has taken two thousand years to build.

When I read statements that the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe—three billion dollars a year—is excessive, I think of the U.S. gross national product now approaching a thousand billion dollars a year which this effort protects. The NATO effort does not look excessive when weighed against the risks and burdens we would face if NATO did not exist, or if its collective forces were to erode and disintegrate.

For a graphic picture of what instability, loss of cohesion and breakdown of security could mean, we have today only to look around us at other areas of the world—the Mid-East to name but one.

The Mission Remains

The brief survey I have given of the realities that face and test the Alliance can perhaps best be concluded by quoting some thoughts expressed by General Gruenther nearly 16 years ago. They remain as true today as they were then.

In his report on the first five years of NATO he said:

"We are apt to forget that the North Atlantic Treaty could have been just another scrap of paper, and SHAPE itself just another headquarters. The success of NATO and of SHAPE has been due to the will ability of the human beings who have worked to bring about this success. Although the early years of SHAPE had a full share of hard work and often of frustrations, I foresee that the next few years will be even more difficult than those we have left behind us, not because our defenses are weaker, but because the danger to our unity becomes greater as it is supported by an illusion of security. But I have no doubt that the difficulties can be overcome. I have confidence that we can succeed in our mission—to safeguard peace and security in Western Europe."

I believe we can still have that confidence. The Alliance will have a basis for confidence so long as our citizens understand the necessity for making the contributions which continue to ensure the peace and our freedom.

Twenty-one years of success tell us that the job can be done.

Reviews 'Amnesty Programs'

Drug Abuse In Armed Forces Outlined To Special Subcommittee

(Continued From Page One)

The suggestion that "amnesty programs" be instituted by each of the Services was recommended by a Task Group, chaired by Vice Adm. Mack. The Task Group Report was approved by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and is in the process of implementation.

Vice Adm. Mack explained to the Subcommittee, "We must be certain that any 'amnesty program' will not deter the maintenance of military posture and discipline throughout the Armed Services. It is for this reason that the recommendation is couched in terms of 'an amnesty program . . . should be given a trial.'

"In short, we believe that this is one area of responsibility that appears to have means of aiding some of the less mature members of the Department of Defense who experiment and become trapped through the abuse of some of these dangerous drugs. However, these programs must be tempered by the over-all responsibilities of military commanders to assure that discipline is maintained and that our basic mission to defend our country is not compromised.

The admiral pointed out:

"**First**, there is at present no danger from drug abuse to the National Security in the area of our ability to deliver nuclear weapons or to defend against them, or in other sensitive areas such as cryptography.

"**Second**, our combat forces in Vietnam and other potential combat areas are capable of carrying out their mission. Although there have been instances where individuals failed because of drug abuse, no mission failed.

"**Third**, in spite of these assurances, there is evidence that the minds and bodies of substantial numbers of our young servicemen are being damaged by drug abuse."

Reviewing the scope of the drug abuse problem, Mr. Bartimo told the subcommittee, "Drug involvement in the Armed Forces has increased each year since 1965. This is true in the United States, in Vietnam, and worldwide. It is true with regard to the hard narcotics, the dangerous drugs, and marijuana.

"If the figures and reports that we presently have for the first six months of 1970 are indicative of the magnitude of the problem for the entire year, we can anticipate that for the 12-month period of 1970, total drug involvement in the Armed Forces will more than have doubled worldwide, since 1969.

Individuals in the Armed Forces Investigated for Involvement with Marijuana During Calendar Years 1968-1970

	1968	1969	1970 (1st 6 months)
Vietnam	4,188	7,737	4,818
CONUS	9,311	12,126	7,488
Worldwide	16,868	25,976	16,324

Mr. Bartimo

Vice Adm. Mack

"Although involvement with marijuana constitutes by far the greatest number of cases investigated by the military departments in all areas of the world, that fact is of little consolation when the statistics show that the use of heroin and the other hard narcotics in the Armed Forces has been approximately doubling each year since 1967. Thus, the often quoted statement with respect to the experimental relationship between marijuana and heroin seems to be borne out—that where marijuana goes the hard drugs soon follow."

Mr. Bartimo explained that when a member of the Armed Forces becomes involved with drugs various forms of action may result.

He stated that the experimenter, first-time, or infrequent

(Continued On Next Page)

PERSONS DISQUALIFIED FROM THE ARMED FORCES FOR DRUG ABUSE CY 1964 - 1970



Reviews 'Amnesty Programs'

Drug Abuse In Armed Forces Outlined To Special Subcommittee

(Continued From Preceding Page)

user, is very likely counseled, admonished, and closely supervised to insure that no further involvement results.

Mr. Bartimo continued, "Persistent abusers who decline medical and/or psychological or psychiatric help receive some form of administrative action, non-judicial discipline or are court-martialed.

"In more cases than not individuals administratively separated from the Service for drug involvement are not drug addicts in the true sense of the term, but are individuals involved with drugs who also have a record of other conduct such that their retention does not serve the best interests of themselves or the Armed Forces.

"Traffickers in drugs are prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice."

In the Department of Defense's efforts to combat drug abuse, Mr. Bartimo pointed out, "Our efforts have been materially assisted by the President's personal leadership in the fight against drug abuse in this country. We work closely with and are a member of the White House Task Force on Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs. . . .

"To further Defense's comprehensive educational program, extensive drug abuse educational material has been prepared in conjunction with the Office of Information for the Armed Forces."

He noted that members of the DoD Drug Abuse Control Committee have made numerous on-site inspection trips to military installations. Currently, a team from the Committee is making an extensive inspection and evaluation in the Pacific area, including Southeast Asia, Japan and Korea.

It was pointed out that last May a Joint DoD/Department of Justice military drug investigation school was sent to Wiesbaden, Germany, where 70 investigators from various countries in Europe and North Africa attended it. The group was largely composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; however, four German, two British and two Canadian investigators also attended.

Also, three public seminars for non-investigative personnel were conducted. One session was devoted to U.S. dependent junior high school students, one to U.S. dependent high school students and one to airmen, noncommissioned officers, officers, supervisors and interested adults.

Mr. Bartimo informed the Subcommittee, "This experience has shown that such programs are much needed and desired. Consequently, we are formulating plans to give this type of training, including the seminars, in other areas of the world as well as in the United States. With Department of Justice support, plans are underway for a two-week training school

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Editor: John C. Becher

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and concurrent public seminars for United States military personnel and their dependents in the Far East (Japan) this November."

He added, "Policy guidelines have been developed for Department of Defense overseas dependent schools which provide for the involvement of a meaningful drug, alcohol, and tobacco abuse curriculum. The program is now being implemented in all DoD overseas dependent schools."

In the enforcement area generally, Mr. Bartimo said, Service investigators are receiving specialized and expanded training in drug identification. In addition, basic drug offense indoctrination is given to all Armed Forces law enforcement personnel.

The Subcommittee was informed that marijuana detecting dogs are in use by the Armed Forces and have proved to be highly successful at border crossing points, at points of embarkation, in military mail facilities and for inspections aboard aircraft. Other devices also have been recommended to the Services—including the Bucky X-Ray fluoroscope device. "They have been obtained and are being used now in Vietnam and elsewhere to 'look' for narcotics and other contraband in parcels and packages."

Mr. Bartimo noted, "It is undoubtedly true that in spite of very vigorous enforcement programs there are cases which escape investigation. However, we are confident that due to the unique environment of military life, characterized by close personal association and strict supervision of those in the ranks by noncommissioned officers, doctors, and line officers it is unlikely that any great number of persistent drug or marijuana users would go wholly undetected for any protracted period of time.

"It is definitely clear that marijuana presents the greatest problem from the standpoint of frequency or extent of use . . ."

Making reference to the "amnesty programs," Mr. Bartimo said, "It is important that our rehabilitation endeavors be directed not only to the hard narcotic and chronic abuser but also to the curious experimenter who is generally an immature youth. We are attempting to establish programs which will take advantage of existing rehabilitation facilities available both in the military and civilian sectors . . . The rehabilitation of drug abusers who are not addicts in the true sense of the word, and this represents the majority of military drug abusers, is for the most part a matter of strengthening and reorienting an individual whose personality and character traits are inadequate."

In his concluding statement, Mr. Bartimo said, "I cannot emphasize too strongly that by far the overwhelming majority of servicemen, like other American youth, are not drug users or addicts. . . ."

(See Related Story On Next Page)

ADDRESSES OFFICERS—The Honorable John D. Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, meets with Rear Admiral Herbert H. Anderson, Commander U.S. South Atlantic Force, aboard the flagship USS Harry E. Yarnell (DLG-17). Ambassador Lodge was aboard Yarnell in Puerto Belgrano, Argentina, during the Unitas XI visit to that city. Admiral Anderson commands the Unitas XI task force, which is circling South America. During his visit on the guided missile frigate, Ambassador Lodge presented a short address to the ship's officers and was given a close-up view of her modern weapons systems.

'Amnesty Program' Helps Drug Abusers In Vietnam

Following are excerpts of Mr. Bartimo's testimony in which he elaborated on Vice Adm. Mack's statement regarding the so-called "amnesty programs."

Within strict guidelines such programs exist, particularly in Vietnam, as a means toward encouraging and enabling individuals to seek out professional help in overcoming drug abuse problems. They are programs which are sponsored by the individual military commands.

The program within the Military Assistance Command (Vietnam) was designed to place the problem of "drug abuse" at that level of command nearest the problem and where the most effective means to deal with the problem could be employed, that is at the company or battalion level. As established, it provides the opportunity for the individual soldier to turn himself in for professional help without fear of disciplinary action. He may do so to any number of people; his platoon or company commander, the unit chaplain or surgeon, the provost marshal, or others in authority.

There are undoubtedly many individual reasons why the abuser seeks help.

Some of the known ones are: his fear of apprehension, normally after a friend has been apprehended; or the individual is approaching the time of his return to the United States and wants to stop because of parental, social or economic reasons; or he may realize that he abuses drugs because of a psychological problem and that the drugs will not solve the problem; or he may feel that he is becoming habituated to drugs and he wants to stop before the abuse becomes worse.

Few marijuana users take advantage of the amnesty program. They rationalize that they are not addicted, and believe they can stop anytime they desire. The few marijuana users who do take advantage of the program fear that they may progress to other drugs and that they do not have the self-discipline required to stop of their own accord. Those individuals who are abusing hard narcotics, barbiturates or amphetamines realize that they must have professional help and, upon their decision to stop taking drugs, take advantage of the amnesty program.

Although the unit chaplain or surgeon would normally be the first point of contact by the abuser, the amnesty program is not designed for them to provide the long term help.

Initial counseling of the individual is conducted by the unit surgeon to determine whether the individual requires physiological or psychological medical attention and, if possible, to ascertain the causative factor or problem prompting the use of drugs. Following medical attention, if required, and during the initial or subsequent counseling session the individual is asked to name a member of his unit for whom he has respect and who he feels has a sincere interest in his well-being. The person so named is interviewed with a view to obtaining his views on drug abuse and to determine his character and ability to act as a lay-counselor. If acceptable, the person selected and the individual seeking help are brought together and the latter's problems discussed openly and frankly. The person chosen to help unofficially monitors the individual's progress and, since he is in the unit area, responds immediately if the drug abuser experiences an uncontrollable desire to further use drugs.

The effectiveness of the program depends upon the clear understanding of its provisions by all. There are certain exceptions to the program. Freedom from disciplinary action is not granted to: (1) those currently under investigation for marijuana or drug abuse, (2) those persons having marijuana or drugs on their person or otherwise in their possession at the time they request help, or (3) those persons, who, having begun a program of rehabilitation under the amnesty program subsequently use or possess marijuana or drugs.

In order to avoid jeopardizing the program, the commander is required to ensure that to participate each member understands that:

—He must discard or destroy all marijuana or other proscribed drugs in his possession or under his control before he requests help; otherwise, he is subject to disciplinary action.

—An individual coming within one of the three exceptions to participation in the amnesty program should remain silent or he may incriminate himself.

—The amnesty conferred by the program extends only to the individual and not to others who may have been involved, consequently they are not protected from disclosures made by the individual.

—The individual will forfeit the amnesty granted by the program if he subsequently uses or possesses marijuana or other proscribed drugs.

Emphasis is given to the education of every member of the unit concerning the limitations and exceptions to the program.

A concomitant factor of the program is the establishment of amnesty boxes within the unit area. The box is clearly labeled as an "Amnesty Box" and has a copy of the unit amnesty order posted on it. The box is constructed to prevent items from being retrieved. Periods of time are set aside each morning, afternoon and evening during which an individual desiring to get rid of marijuana or other proscribed drugs may do so without fear of being found in possession of such drugs while enroute to the box or enroute to seek help. An individual observed going to the amnesty box is not subsequently searched or questioned as a result thereof. Further, in order that the program may truly function with amnesty, individuals are assured that names and records will not be kept.

The program in Vietnam is gaining momentum and personnel there are optimistic that it will prove effective. Surgeons and commanders remark that it is a success. Amnesty boxes in the unit areas encourage the drug user to take advantage of the program and enable officers and non-commissioned officers to point out the program's benefits to suspected drug abusers.

We are aware of the limitations of any so-called amnesty program. No such effort can realistically purport to be a panacea for the problem of drug abuse. However, we believe it is a useful tool which, properly used, will have a beneficial result. We are not satisfied with our efforts, nor will we be so long as drug involvement remains a menace to our society.

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